This will come as no surprise to many people:
College Parks is a deeply ailing community, ravaged by a sustained business exodus and white exurban flight. Crime is high and jobs are few, but a gun buyback will do little to overhaul the structural root of the city’s decline and crime.
Federal studies show these programs earn only the participation of law-abiding working class poor, for whom $100 would go a long way in diapers and groceries. Meanwhile, still-armed criminals rule the slumburb.
This is the first I’ve heard of “slumburb” but it is appropriate and is very descriptive.
In a 2004 report, the National Research Council, the analytical arm of the National Academy of Sciences, criticized the theoretical underpinning of buybacks–a necessary consequence of fewer guns is fewer gun-related crimes–“badly flawed” and among the least effective vehicles to stem gun violence.
Empirical evidenced gleaned from buyback programs across the country indicated reclaimed weapons fell into two categories: malfunctioning firearms and inherited weapons from disinterested owners. By contrast, researchers said those gun owners who acquired weapons, either legally or by theft, with the intent of engaging in criminal activity were wholly unlikely to participate.
Wait A Minute here….everyone hold up! You mean actual research has been done and determined that ‘gun buy backs’ are among the least effective method to reduce gun violence. Well call me unsurprised. People who actually study ‘gun control’ issues knew this and have said it for many years.
The report (link here) spells out why gun buy backs are ineffective
The theory on which gun buy-back programs is based is flawed in three respects. First, the guns that are typically surrendered in gun buy-backs are those that are least likely to be used in criminal activities. Typically, the guns turned in tend to be of two types: (1) old, malfunctioning guns whose resale value is less than the reward offered in buy-back programs or (2) guns owned by individuals who derive little value from the possession of the guns (e.g., those who have inherited guns). The Police Executive Research Forum (1996) found this in their analysis of the differences between weapons handed in and those used in crimes. In contrast, those who are either using guns to carry out crimes or as protection in the course of engaging in other illegal activities, such as drug selling, have actively acquired their guns and are unlikely to want to participate in such programs.
Second, because replacement guns are relatively easily obtained, the actual decline in the number of guns on the street may be smaller than the number of guns that are turned in. Third, the likelihood that any particular gun will be used in a crime in a given year is low. In 1999, approximately 6,500 homicides were committed with handguns. There are approximately 70 million handguns in the United States. Thus, if a different handgun were used in each homicide, the likelihood that a particular handgun would be
used to kill an individual in a particular year is 1 in 10,000. The typical gun buy-back program yields less than 1,000 guns. Even ignoring the first two points made above (the guns turned in are unlikely to be used by criminals and may be replaced by purchases of new guns), one would expect a reduction of less than one-tenth of one homicide per year in response to such a gun buy-back program. The program might be cost-effective if those were the correct parameters, but the small scale makes it highly unlikely that its effects would be detected.
In light of the weakness in the theory underlying gun buy-backs, it is not surprising that research evaluations of U.S. efforts have consistently failed to document any link between such programs and reductions in gun violence (Callahan et al., 1994; Police Executive Research Forum, 1996; Rosenfeld, 1996). (emphasis mine)
That report is very interesting to read. Chapter 5 about Defensive Gun Uses has this to say:
How many times each year do civilians use firearms defensively? The answers provided to this seemingly simple question have been confusing. Consider the findings from two of the most widely cited studies in the field: McDowall et al. (1998), using the data from 1992 and 1994 waves of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), found roughly 116,000 defensive gun uses per year, and Kleck and Gertz (1995), using data from the 1993 National Self-Defense Survey (NSDS), found around 2.5 million defensive gun uses each year.
Many other surveys provide information on the prevalence of defensive gun use. Using the original National Crime Survey, McDowall and Wiersema (1994) estimate 64,615 annual incidents from 1987 to 1990. At least 19 other surveys have resulted in estimated numbers of defensive gun uses that are similar (i.e., statistically indistinguishable) to the results founds by Kleck and Gertz. No other surveys have found numbers consistent with the NCVS (other gun use surveys are reviewed in Kleck and Gertz, 1995, and Kleck, 2001a).
Even at the lowest rate (64,615 per year) that is 12 defensive gun uses per day. But the real shocker is the last two lines.
At least 19 other surveys have resulted in estimated numbers of defensive gun uses that are similar (i.e., statistically indistinguishable) to the results founds by Kleck and Gertz. No other surveys have found numbers consistent with the NCVS
19 other surveys have found results statistically indistinguishable to the Kleck & Gertz study — 19! And not one has found numbers as low as the NCVS!
That means there are around 6,800 defensive gun uses per day folks!!
Wonder what other great nuggets of information are to be found — good thing I can sign in as a guest and download it for free.
Please join the discussion.